We examine the impact of the pricing regime on price variability with reference to the non-ferrous metals industry. Theory fails to give unambiguous predictions. Slade (1991) claimed that metals price volatility increased in the nineeen eighties relative to the seventies, and that this was associated with a move from administered producer pricing to exchange pricing. The former claim is not robust to exclusion of silver from Slade's sample, and this suggests that her argument may have been unduly in ‡uenced by the Hunt silver manipulation. Extension of Slade's sample to the present indicates that any early di¤erences between the variability of producer and exchange prices have now vanished.
Introduction
There are two competing forms of market organization in the non-agricultural primary sector -exchange pricing and producer (administered) pricing. Under exchange pricing, products are sold "basis" an exchange price, or a short time average of such prices, at or near the delivery date. Under producer pricing, producers set product prices on a list basis, and transactions prices are negotiated at variable, often secret, discounts from the list prices. Economists tend to prefer exchange pricing on the arguments that it is informationally more e¢cient and that it inhibits price discrimination. By contrast, producing companies suggest that producer pricing guarantees greater predictability.
In the post-1945 period, crude oil was subject to producer pricing, with prices set …rst by the oil majors and then by OPEC, until the breakdown of OPEC discipline together with the advent of oil futures trading resulted in a move to exchange pricing in the mid eighties.
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In non-ferrous metals, aluminium and nickel prices were also set by dominant producers through to the mid-eighties, but both are now exchange priced.
2
Over the same period, copper saw producer pricing in the United States coexisting with exchange pricing elsewhere in the (non-socialist) world, although major producers attempted to "control" exchange prices for a period in the early sixties as a prelude to moving to producer pricing. 3 Of major metals, only iron and steel are now priced by producers.
We are not aware of theoretical discussions of the relative variability of prices under producer and exchange pricing, although there has been substantial discussion of the question of whether futures trading reduces price variability -see Turnovsky (1983) for a summary. However, in this paper, we focus solely on the price discovery features of exchange trading that arise from centralization, and that literature is therefore not directly relevant. We suggest two e¤ects from centralization which potentially a¤ect price variability, but in opposite directions.
² Centralization pools shocks across di¤erent producer markets. The resulting risk sharing tends to reduce price variability.
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The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) started trading Gulf crude oil in 1983. The International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) followed with Brent crude in 1988. 2 Aluminium and nickel trading started on the London Metal Exchange (LME) in 1979. The Comex division of NYMEX introduced an unsuccessful aluminium contract in the mid eighties, and relaunched aluminum trading in 1999. 3 Copper has been traded on Comex and the LME through most of the twentieth century. It is now also traded in Shanghai and Singapore. See McNicol (1975) on the coexistence of producer and exchange pricing in copper and Prain (1975) on the attempt by the non-US copper mining companies to "control" price movements on the LME. Radetzki (1990) provides an overview of commodity pricing arrangements.
² There is evidence that demand for metals is negatively related to price variability. Producers therefore have an incentive to smooth price movements. In a centralized market, however, price variability is a public "bad", and a sub-optimal degree of smoothing takes place.
Overall, therefore the volatility a¤ects of a move from producer to exchange pricing is ambiguous. An alternative argument might be that "speculation" either increases or decreases price variability. However, this argument relates to the possible e¤ects of centralization on storage, and/or the e¤ects of futures trading on price discovery. In this paper we consider only the direct e¤ects of centralization. 4 In an in ‡uential article, Slade (1991) used monthly data on six metals over the sample 1970-1986 to examine, inter alia, whether prices are more variable under exchange pricing than producer pricing. She concluded (a) that price variability was higher in the second half of her sample relative to the …rst and (b) that this increase in variability was due in part to a shift to exchange pricing. The …rst of the theoretical arguments adduced above goes against Slade's conclusions, while the second supports them. We will argue that Slade's conclusions are fragile even within her original sample, and that, if her sample is extended to include more recent data, there appears little di¤erence between the price variability associated with the two regimes. 
Theoretical Considerations
If …rms set producer prices, will this result in greater or lesser price variability than would arise if prices were set on an organized exchange? A di¢culty in attempting to answer this question is knowing how to characterize producer pricing.
One approach is to suppose …rms set prices that are held constant for long periods of time, with the implication that demand shocks are absorbed either by inventories or through production response. But this prompts the questions, for how long are prices maintained constant and why do …rms choose to smooth prices. In any case, although producers who operate this 4 On storage, see Turnovsky (1983) and the references therein, and Gilbert (1989) . On price discovery, see Stein (1986). 5 In related work, Brunetti and Gilbert (1995) argued that the variability of LME metals prices is trendless from the mid seventies to the mid nineties.
type of regime maintain broadly constant list prices, they also typically o¤er variable but secret discounts on these list prices. It is therefore incorrect to see transactions prices as being completely smoothed.
In what follows, we assume that the perceived price variability is an argument to demand functions, and this provides …rms with an incentive to smooth prices. This assumption may be justi…ed in the metals industry by noting that consumers of re…ned metals are typically metals semifabricating companies who work on narrow margins. Margin variability will increase the riskiness of their operations. To the extent that this risk is non-diversi…able and non-insurable, it will require either that …rms seek higher returns. Alternatively they may use futures contracts, if available, to hedge their positions and thereby o¤set this risk, but this will normally impose additional cost. Some evidence for the proposition that demand depends negatively on price variability is provided in the appendix -we …nd a signi…cant negative e¤ect of price variability on the demand for tin, and smaller and near signi…cant e¤ect on the demand for copper and zinc. 6 A second important issue in modelling producer pricing is whether and how …rms compete. One approach is to suppose that they compete in some other dimension (e.g. product quality); an alternative is to suppose that markets are divided up between …rms so that each …rm is a monopolist in its own market. Although there are minor di¤erences between metals brands, product homogeneity is a reasonable assumption in non-ferrous metals, and hence we adopt this latter course.
Under exchange trading, a single price is set which clears the entire market. Under this system, demand shocks which would have a¤ected only a¤ect a single …rm under the producer regime are spread across the market. So long as shocks are less than perfectly correlated, this diversi…cation e¤ect will reduce price variability relative to the producer pricing regime. This suggests that exchange pricing should give rise to lower price variability than producer pricing.
The second e¤ect works in the opposite direction. Firms will be conscious of the impact of price variability on the position of the demand function and therefore on their pro…ts. However, under a centralized system, …rms know that any attempt to smooth prices, e¤ectively by unsmoothing production, 6 Regresions are on annual data. We calculate price variability as the intra-year coe¢-cient of variarion of the daily LME cash price. There was no evidence of this e¤ect on the demand for aluminium, lead or nickel, but the aluminium and nickel samples are relatively short.
will impact across the entire industry. Smoothing therefore generates externalities across the industry, while under producer pricing, these externalities were completely internalized. Firms therefore have less incentive to smooth than under producer pricing, and the extent of smoothing will decline as the number of …rms in the industry rises.
Overall, therefore, the model fails to deliver an unambiguous prediction as to which market structure will deliver the lower level of price variability. This will depend on the number of …rms in the industry, and on model parameter values. A formal model within which these conclusions are derived is set out in the appendix.
Slade's Analysis
Slade (1991) argued that exchange pricing results in greater price variability than producer pricing. The prices she analyzed are those of silver (Ag), aluminium (Al), copper (Cu), nickel (Ni), lead (Pb) and zinc (Zn). She compared price variability in two sub-samples, 1970-79 and 1980-86. Table  1 summarizes the trading regimes for these metals. List prices until late '80s Cu LME, Comex List prices in USA until late '80s Ni LME (from 1979) List prices until late '80s Pb LME List prices in USA until late '80s Zn LME List prices until late '80s
In what follows, we suggest that Slade's conclusions are unduly in ‡uenced by the inclusion of silver in her sample. Silver di¤ers from the other …ve metals Slade considers in that it is in part a precious as well as an industrial metal, 9 and that it has no recent history of producer pricing. Most seriously, Silver was also traded for aprts of this period on the Chciago Board of Trade (CBT) and the LME. Silver is hold as a store of value in certain countries, most notably India and Pakistan, the silver market was manipulated over 1979-80 (the so-called Hunt episode), with the consequence that silver prices increased from under $6 per ounce to over $38 per ounce in less than one year. We contend that this episode is largely responsible for Slade's conclusions that price volatility increased in the eighties, and that exchange pricing generates greater volatility than exchange pricing. This is the only instance in Slade's sample in which a regulatory authority has established manipulation of metals futures, 10 and it therefore seems reasonable to regard it as exceptional.
We have monthly averages of price quotations for Slade's six metals for the twenty-eight year period 1970-1997. We divide the sample into four subperiods: Period I (1970-79) and Period II (1980 -1986 are those analyzed by Slade with the break corresponding to the introduction of futures trading in aluminum and nickel. We de…ne Period III as covering 1987 to 1993, and Period IV as 1994-97. Period III covers the metals price boom of 1987-90 while Period IV saw quieter market conditions.
In Periods I and II we use Slade's data.
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We update these data to Periods III and IV, using Datastream for exchange price quotations and Metal Statistics (various issues) for producer prices. Data de…nitions are as in Slade. Again following Slade, we measure price variability as the variance of the monthly logarithmic change in prices in each sub-period, although in what follows, we quote these variability measures as standard deviations. In principle, this would give a 6 (metals) times 4 (sub-samples) times 2 (pricing regimes) block of variabilities, a total of 48 observations. However, there is a number of gaps: there are no producer prices for silver (4 gaps) and there are no exchange prices for aluminum and nickel in Period I (2 gaps). Furthermore, although there are two separate zinc producer price quotations for Periods 1 and II (one European and one north American) we do have been unable to obtain European quotations for Periods III and IV. We therefore and these stocks have implications for price variability.
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The CFTC case against the Hunt brothers is discussed in Williams (1995) . In May 1998, the CFTC issued an opinion and order against Sumitomo Corporation of Japan in which they found that Sumitomo had upwardly manipulated the price of copper and copper futures . In May 199, the CFTC …led proceedings aginst General Minerals and Metals (GMM) and others claiming manipulation of the copper market . These claims relate to the period 1993-96.
11
We are grateful to Margaret Slade for allowing us to use her data. Slade adjusted her aluminium prices to a transaction basis but we have been unable to reproduce these changes. As a consequence, our results di¤er slightly from those she reports. However, these di¤erences do not have any substantive implications.
have a total of 42 variability observations.
In Tables 2 and 3, which correspond to Table IV in Slade, we report the variability of metals prices by time period (averaging variances across metals and price regimes, Table 2 ) and by pricing regime (averaging variances across metals and time periods). The increase in price variability reported by Slade between periods I and II is apparent in the …rst row of Table 2. 12 However, this increased variability disappears when silver is dropped from the sample. Furthermore, the nonparametric Wilcoxen test for equality of means, used by Slade, fails to reject the null of equality even when silver is present (test statistic is 142 which is less than the 5% critical value of 167).
Price variability does increase in Period III, when metals were in tight supply, but falls back in Period IV. This is in line with the results reported in Brunetti and Gilbert (1995) , who also develop a fundamentals-based model of metals price variability. Column 1 of Table 3 shows the higher price variability associated with exchange pricing in Slade's sample, but also demonstrates that this increased price variability is substantially moderated when silver is excluded from the sample. The …nal two rows of the table report the Wilcoxen equality of 12 Slade omitted the producer prices for copper and nickel for her calculations for Period II. The …gures we give in Table 2 include these prices. Using the same basis as Slade our Period II variability statistics are 6.47% with silver included and 5.06% with silver excluded. The variability …gures for Oeruids III and IV reported in Table 2 are based on all available price quotations. means test for the variability of exchange and producer pricing, …rst including and the excluding silver. The upper two-sided critical value for the test corresponding to 5% size is given parenthetically.. In agreement with Slade, we can reject the hypothesis of equality when silver is included, but not if silver is excluded.
In column 2 of Table 3 , we see that the price variability is actually lower for exchange prices in the …nal two periods, although this di¤erence is not signi…cant. Even if exchange pricing did result in greater price variability historically, this is no longer the case. Pooling the two sub-samples gives comparable results to those obtained from the …rst sub-sample.
As Slade notes, potentially more powerful tests can be obtained from paired comparison of producer and exchange prices in periods in which both operate. A further advantage of this comparison is that it will not be sensitive to the anomalous behaviour of the silver market, since the absence of a silver producer price eliminates it from this comparison. The results of the paired comparisons, which use the Wilcoxen signed rank test, are given in Table 4 (95% upper tail critical values in parentheses). These comparisons con…rm Slade's …nding of a signi…cant di¤erence between the variability of exchange and producer prices in Periods I and II, either using the entire sample, or omitting copper and nickel producer prices in Period II. However, the di¤erences cease to be signi…cant in Periods III and IV.
The apparent convergence of exchange and producer price variability over the more recent periods prompts us to ask investigate the directions of causality between exchange and producer prices for those metals where the two systems coexist. If exchange markets are characterized by thin trading and are illiquid, producers have considerable latitude in setting prices and can, if they so choose, maintain prices at constant levels for extended periods of time. In such circumstances, exchange prices tend to be speculations on possible changes in producer list prices -see Ghosh et al (1987) . This may have been broadly the case in the sample Slade investigated. However, once exchanges become liquid, metals consumers can purchase from (or resell to) 13 These comparisons use the US producer price for zinc. exchanges if this becomes attractive, and this possibility forces producers to adjust their prices more frequently, in line with exchange quotations. This suggests that while in the …rst half of our sample we might expect to …nd producer price changes causing exchange price changes, but not vice versa, in the second half of the sample, we might expect this to be reversed.
We investigate this hypothesis by performing Granger non-causality tests on the time series of monthly price returns. We divide the overall sample into two sub-samples, 1970-83 and 1984-97, each containing 167 monthly observations. 14 The results of the non-causality tests are reported in Table  5 where P ! E indicates a test of the null hypothesis that producer prices Granger non-cause exchange prices (so a signi…cant value, implying rejection of the null, indicates causality), while E ! P indicates a test of the null hypothesis that exchange prices Granger non-cause producer prices. The results of these tests show causality from exchange to producer prices over both periods, but most emphatically in the later period. However, only in nickel is there evidence of causality from producer to exchange prices in the period after 1984. This is consistent with the view expressed above that where producers still retain list prices, they are now obliged to move these in line with exchange price movements.
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14 There are insu¢cient observations on aluminium and nickel for this technique to be implemented in the …rst half of nthe sample.
Conclusions
In principle, exchange-based pricing may result in either more or less price variability than producer pricing. Slade (1991) argued that, empirically, the move away from producer pricing increase variability. We have re-examined and updated her results. Her claim that price variability increased between the nineteen seventies and eighties is not robust to the exclusion of silver from her sample. This suggests that this conclusion may rely on the Hunt manipulation. In extending Slade's data to the present, we …nd that there is no general tendency for price variability to increase.
Slade also argued that exchange pricing gives rise to greater price variability than producer pricing. This claim appears true in the sample Slade examined, although exclusion of silver somewhat weakens the evidence, but extension of her sample shows that there is no longer any divergence between price variability between the two sets of institutions. Granger non-causality tests support the view that this is because producers are now obliged to adjust list prices in line with exchange prices. However, it remains an open question whether actual transaction prices, as distinct from list prices, were less variable under producer pricing than they are under exchange pricing.
A Appendix: Theoretical Model

A.1 Producer Pricing
There are n identical …rms which produce an identical product. Firm i (i = 1; :::; n) produces output x i with cost function c(x i ). We characterize producer pricing in terms of segmented markets so that each …rm sells into its own market. Firm i faces demand curve D(p i ; ! i ; u i ) where p i is the price set by …rm i, ! 2 i = V ar(p i ) and u i is a demand shift disturbance satisfying E (u i ) = 0 and V ar (u i ) = ¾ 2 . We assume
< 0, the latter assumption arising because consuming …rms (typically semifabricators in the metals industry) wish to be able to quote product prices without running risks with regard to their pro…t margins. For simplicity, we ignore stockholding so that D i (p i ; ! i ; u i ) = x i . Firms observe the demand shocks u i prior to setting prices so that, in the case of segmented markets, one may equivalently regard …rms as either setting output or price. We therefore characterize …rms as choosing output x i according to the rule x i = X(u i ) in order to maximize expected pro…ts.
For tractability, we need to assume linearity. For simplicity we assume a constant marginal cost function implying
and set
If the …rm sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost without regard to the variance term ! i , the resulting price is
This implies
However, under rational expectations, the …rm will wish to take into account the result of its pricing policy on the position of its demand curve. To model this, we look for a rational expectations price or output rule which maximizes expected pro…ts. For reasons of tractability, we restrict attention to linear rules of the form
Here,¸= 1 gives myopic pro…t maximization and a value of¸< 1 implies an element of price smoothing. Equation (5) implies ! i =°2¯so that
This obliges the …rm to produce
so that¸= 2 ¡ µ. Expected pro…ts are then
This expression is maximized by settinģ
Noting that the ® ¡¯b > 0 (required for production to be pro…table), we obtain¸<
In what follows, we shall assume ³°´2 to be negligibly small and writȩ
The …rm's price variability ! is therefore
where we have dropped the …rm subscript since, under our assumptions, the variance will be equal in all n markets. In what follows, we denote this value of ! as ! p :
A.2 Exchange Pricing
Now suppose the n …rms sell into a common market, each …rm choosing its output on a Cournot basis to maximize its own pro…ts. We initially suppose that they ignore the impact of their output decision on the price variance. Since we have assumed the …rms are identical, the inverse demand curve is
Consider the …rst …rm and write X = x 1 +X s1 : It follows that …rm 1's output is
By symmetry, aggregate output is
and, for reference, …rm 1's output is
The market clearing price is therefore
We assume that the ith …rm's disturbance term u i = v i + w, where the disturbance w is common across all n …rms. We further assume
w and E (v i w) = 0, (i = 1; ::; n). It follows that E (U ) = 0 and
where´= ¾ 2 w ¾ 2 . We can therefore conclude that
Note in equation (19) that 0 < ' < 1. Now suppose …rms take into account their own impact on the price variance, but maintain the Cournot assumption with regard to their conjectures in relation to their competitors.. In the context of Cournot competition, we need to modify …rms' output decisions rather than, as previously, their price decisions. Extending the procedure adopted in the context of producer pricing, we now look for a rational expectations equilibrium -i.e. a Nash equilibrium in output rules. Again, for tractability, we restrict attention to linear rules. This suggests setting the …rst …rm's output according to the rule (contrast equation (16))
If …rm 1 conjectures that other …rms use the same pricing rule but with µ 1 replaced by µ s1 ,conjectured aggregate output is
Using equation (17), conjectured market clearing price is
Given this pricing rule, the conjectured price variance satis…es
Substituting
where we assume that
1, and,
Maximizing with respect to µ 1
As previously, we ignore the terms in ³°´2 allowing us to simplify to
By symmetry, all …rms make the same conjectures in equilibrium, implying µ 1 = µ s1 Hence
where we now drop the …rm subscript.
For comparability with the case of a single …rm, write¸= n+1 n ¡ µ, so that, from equation (24)
and, from equation (29)¸=
Price variability ! therefore becomes
Note that, for n = 1, equation (31) reduces to equation (11) and equation (32) reduces to equation (12); and when°= 0, it reduces to equation (19) . In what follows, we denote this value of ! as ! e :
A.3 Comparison
We are now in a position to compare ! p and ! e (equations (12) and (32). There are two e¤ects. Since ' < 1, the initial term in each expression suggests that
. This is the consequence of the exchange market averaging the impact of any shock across all n markets. However, the second term, which measures the impact of price variability on consumption, goes the other way, since with a larger number of …rms, each …rm gains less individual bene…t from smoothing the price. The overall comparison is therefore, in principle, ambiguous.
The inequality ! p > ! e will hold if
This implies that, for even moderately large n, ! p > ! e provided ®°¾ < 2. As n becomes large, this condition reduces to°<
The left hand side of inequality (34) measures the relative importance of the price variability and price responses in the industry demand function (2); the right hand side measures the variability of demand relative to the reference level ®. The more variable demand, the more likely it is that exchange trading will give rise to lower price variability than producer pricing, while the larger the impact of price variability on demand, the more likely that producer pricing will give the lower price variability.
A.4 Estimated Demand Functions
Here we report estimated metals demand functions for copper, tin and zinc using annual data over the sample 1974 to 1998 (25 observations). Re…ned consumption (cons) is regressed on the de ‡ated real price of the metal (price, treated as endogenous), the change in industrial production (IP, as a measure of the position of the demand curve), a time trend (trend), and intra-year daily price volatility (vol). The level of LME warehouse stocks (stocks) is used as an instrument. Tin trading was suspended on the LME from 24 October 1985 until 1 August 1989. The tin price volatility is calculated from LME daily price data for the incomplete years 1985 and 1989, and is set to 5% for 1986-88. A dummy variable (Dummy), equal to one in 1986-89, is included in the regression to account for the arbitrainess of this measure.
Similar equations (not reported) were estimated for lead and, on shorter samples (starting in 1984) for aluminium and nickel. Both the price elasticity and volatility semi-elasticities are best de…ned in the tin demand equation. The most important use of tin is in tin plate, which competes with aluminium in the can market. In the other metals considered, the substitution interface is less evident.
